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JORDAN v. ELLIOTT.
Where a party seeks to be relieved from the obligation of a contract on the ground
of duress per minas, regard will be had to age, sex and condition of life, and if the
threats employed were such as were calculated to deprive the party of his freedom
of will, he will be relieved from liability, even though they were not of such a
character as would produce a like effect on a firm and courageous man.
In such case, evidence is admissible, to show that the person subjected to duress
bad heard that the person using the threats was of a violent disposition, for this may.
be a circumstance which among others led to the execution of the contract.

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Bradford county.
Feigned issue, wherein Thomas R. Jordan and Sarah Jordan, his
wife, in right of said wife, were plaintiffs, and Olive Fox Elliott,
defendant, to determine whether a certain judgment note given by
defendant had been obtained by fraud or by duress per minas.
On the trial, before OUMMIN, P. J., the following facts
appeared:The defendant, Olive Fox Elliott, was a widow of about 77
years of age. Her son, Edward T. Elliott, resided with her. Said
Edward T. Elliott, applied from time to time to the plaintiff, Jordan, for loans of money. Jordan advanced the amounts asked for,
taking as security a judgment note from Elliott, the amount of
which, exclusive of interest, was $7419.78. He also held in
addition to this note, a policy of insurance for $10,000 on Elliott's
life, which the latter had assigned to him as collateral security.
Jordan, desiring to obtain additional security for the debt, pregsed
Elliott from time to time therefor, and Elliott finally agreed to give
him a new judgment note for the entire amount due, in which
defendant was to join as surety. On May 1st 1877, Jordan called
at defendant's house in order to see her son about this new note.
While he was talking to the son, defendant entered the room.
As to what followed, defendant testified substantially as follows:As she came into the room she saw Jordan pacing up and down,
She
and heard him say, "Perhaps, this bitter cup may pass."

JORDAN v. ELLIOTT.

asked him to sit down, but he declined, and continued to walk to
and fro, gesticulating wildly. Elliott asked him repeatedly not to
trouble the defendant, but to these requests Jordan paid no attention, and in a very fierce and excited manner continued to talk of
the amount due him.
Defendant became very much alarmed at this conduct, and began,
together with several other women in the room, to cry. Jordan
then proposed to her to give him a judgment note for the whole
amount due. This proposition she at first declined, begging Jordan to postpone the matter for a day, as she was not in a fit condition to transact business. Elliott also interposed at this point,
entreating Jordan not to trouble defendant. Jordan, however,
thrust his clenched fist in Elliott's face, commanding him to be
quiet, and turning to defendant, said "By the Eternal, if this
thing is not settled to-day, I have my lawful remedy, and I will
put your son in jail before night." This speech defendant construed to be a threat that Jordan would institute criminal proceedings against her son. And, being thoroughly frightened, she
finally agreed to sign whatever Jordan should tender her. He, thereupon, wrote out on the spot the following judgment note:TOWANDA, Pa., May 1st 1877.
"$7419.78.
After death, for value received, I promise to pay Mrs. Sarah
Jordan, or bearer, Seven Thousand Four Hundred and lNineteen
Dollars and Seventy-Eight Cents, with interest, without stay of
execution, and I hereby authorize any Prothonotary or Attorney
of any Court of Record, to appear and confess judgment for the
above sum with costs, and waive the benefit of all laws exempting
property from levy and sale on execution, and the right of inquisition on real estate. With interest from 14th of February 1877, it
being understood this note is not to be entered unless others are
going to be."

Defendant signed it, but in her agitation, wrote her maiden name,
instead of her married one, a mistake which she testified she had
never before made, and which was, at Jordan's request, immediately
rectified. Jordan then withdrew, but the next day called again,
and was let in at the door by defendant. Being alarmed at his
coming, she asked him to go away. He replied that he only wanted
to leave some papers which belonged to her, and accordingly, produced Elliott's judgment note and the policy of insurance on Elliott's
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life, which he had assigned to her. He then tendered to her the
following receipt which he desired her to sign:" Received, Towanda, Pa., May 1st 1877, of Thomas R. Jordan,
a certain judgment note, dated 2d month, 14th day 1877, for
$7419.78 due at Forty-five days to the order of Thomas R. Jordan,
and signed E. T. Elliott. Also a certain Policy No. 51,958 in the
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co., of Hartford, Conn., for
$10,000, on the life of E. T. Elliott, which said policy was assigned
by E. T. Elliott to Thomas R. Jordan, as a collateral security for
a loan of moneys, and by the said Jordan to me *the aforesaid
securities being this day assigned, sold, and surrendered to me for
which I have executed and delivered to Mrs. Sarah Jordan my own
judgment note dated May 1st 1877, for $7419.78 with interest
from 14th of Feb. 1877, and due after my death." [Which last
said note contained a stipulation that it is not to be entered unless
others are going to be. Now I hereby waive said stipulation and
consent and agree that judgment may be entered on my said note
at any time at the option of the holder thereof.]
Defendant at first declined to sign this paper, but, at length,
consented to do so, upon Jordan's assuring her that it was a mere
receipt for the papers which he had delivered to "her. She did
not read the paper nor was she aware of the contents thereof. As
soon as the receipt -was signed, Jordan threw the old judgment
note of Elliott in the fire, and immediately afterwards quitted the
house.
Defendant's account of what transpired upon both of the occasions when Jordan was at her house was corroborated by several
witnesses who were present. Jordan, being examined, denied the
truth of many of defendant's allegations, and admitted the truth
of others, but stated that he had used no undue influence to induce
the defendant to sign the note or the receipt, and that she was perfectly cognisant of the contents of both those papers before she
signed them.
The note was entered up with the accompanying receipt on May
2d 1877. On May 7th 1877, on affidavit of defendint, the Court
granted a rule to show cause why the judgmeht should not be
opened.
Depositions having been taken., this rule was made absolute, and
the present feigned issue subsequently awarded.
Upon her examination in chief on her own behalf, defendant
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was asked, inter alia, the following question: "Had you at the
time of Jordan's visit heard anything about his reputation as a man
of violence ?" Objected to by plaintiffs. Objection overruled.
Question allowed. Exception. Defendant then replied, "I had
always heard that he was a violent man, but I never saw anything
of it personally until that day."
Plaintiffs presented, inter alia, the following points: 1. The
signature of the defendant to the note, tad stipulation for immediate
judgment being admitted, the burden of proof of want of consideration is upon the defendant; and unless she has satisfied the jury
of such want of cousideration by clear and satisfactory evidence,
their verdict on this point should be for the plaintiff. Ans. "We
affirm the point. Th law is correctly stated in it. The burden
of proof is upon the defendant, Mrs. Elliott. If she seeks to set
aside this judgment note for want of consideration, the burden is
upon her to show this want of consideration by clear .and satisfactory
proof. When a party signs a paper, the presumption is that they
understand what they are doing, and the law holds them to it.
And if they seek to set it aside, the burden is upon them to show
the want of consideration, or whatever other cause they may seek
to set it aside."
3. The claim of duress, or that the note was signed under compulsion, is one easily set up by a person desiring to get rid of an
honest transaction, and when it rests upon the unsupported testimony
of a defendant, should have little weight with a jury. Ans. "This
point we affirm as a general proposition, but what weight is to be
given to the evidence is for the jury, and it is not for us to say
whether it should be little or much. But where a party seeks to
set aside a paper for the causes alleged in this point, and there is
no other proof in the case than the testimony of the party seeking
to set it aside, it would not be sufficient of itself, as we think, to
set aside a paper of that kind. The effect of the evidence, and
what would satisfy your mind as sufficient, of course is for you and
not for us, and you will determine what is sufficient to set aside
such a paper. But when we say that the unsupported testimony
of the party would not be sufficient to set aside a paper, you are to
understand that we do not take that question from you. It is for
you to say what is sufficient to set aside a paper of this kind. We
do not determine the question for you. It is not for us to say what
would be sufficient to set it aside. There might be circumstances
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which would justify the setting it aside, and the question of the
evidence and of the effect of it is for you and not for us."
The plaintiffs also presented a number of points, to the effect
that there was no evidence of such fraud or duress per minas,
as would suffice to invalidate the judgment. All of these points
the court refused.
The court charged, inter alia, as follows:
"There is no question that the note was signed by Mrs. Elliott
on the first day of May; the signature is not denied ; but it is
alleged that the note was obtained from her by false representations,
or by threats, or duress, and that she did not have the control of her
will at the time she signed the note; that there was such restraint
put upon her by what was said by Mr. Jordan, and what was done
there, and the manner in which he did it, that she was put into
such a state of terror and fear that she was not competent to act
for herself; and that really what she did was the will of the person
making the threats, and not her own will. This is really the
important part of this issue. It will be for you to consider all that
occurred on that day. You will notice who was present, what was
said, and how it was said, and what was done, and the circumstances
under which these things were done. It will be also your duty to
consider the writing that was executed that day; and the signature
upon it; the terms of the paper itself, and what effect it was to
have upon the person or property of the person signing it, and
what effect it was to have on her enjoyment of her property'. * * *
"It will be also your duty to consider the situation of the parties,
and what Mr. Jordan went there for, and how he was prepared in
advance for obtaining the signature which he desired.
"It will be your duty to consider the age and sex of the parties
to this transaction, and all the circumstances surrounding the procurement of this signature. Now, it was perfectly competent for
Mrs. Elliott, if she desired to do so, to have given her note, and
to have signed this paper, waiving the stipulation which was contained in the note, in consideration of the taking up of the notes
which her son was liable for to Mr. Jordan. She had a right to do
that, and if she did it in the exercise of her own will, she is bound
by it, just as any other person would be bound, and the transaction
in itself is not unlawvful. It is a lawful transaction, and the only
questions for you to decide are the questions raised by this issueWhether she was induced to sign this note by false representations,
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such as we shall hereafter explain to you in the points submitted,
or whether she did it under the pressure of threats and violence
which deprived her of the exercise of her own will. If she did it in
that way, then it was not her contract, and she would not be bound
by it. * * * You will also consider what took place upon the
occasion of Mr. Jordan's second visit, as having a bearing on this
question."
Verdict and judgment Tor the defendant. Plaintiffs thereupon
took this writ, assigning for error, inter alia, the admission in evidence of defendant's testimony as to her having been told that
plaintiff, Jordan, was a violent man, and the answers to plaintiff's
various points.
W. H. Jessup and Henry Streeter, for plaintiff in error.

1. A. Overton, for defendant in error.
GORDON, J.-On the first of May 1877, Mrs. Olive Elliott, a
widow, aged seventy-seven years, executed to Mrs. Sarah Jordan,
wife of Thomas R. Jordan, a judgment note (not under seal), in
the sum of $7419.78, payable "after death." The alleged consideration for this note appears in a paper purporting to be Mrs. Elliott's
receipt, bearing the same date as that of the note, but, in fact,
executed the day after, that is to say, the delivery to Mrs. Elliott
of a note of her son, E. T. Elliott, to Thomas R. Jordan, in the
same amount as the obligation above stated, and the assignment of a
policy on the life of E. T. Elliott, in the sum of $10,000, and
which, it seems, Jordan held as collateral security. The note thus
obtained from Mrs. Elliott was filed,* and judgment confessed
thereon the next day after its execution, and within five days thereafter application was made to open it, in order to permit a defence
ca the ground of duress and fraud, and, on the sixth of the following May, the rule was made absolute and a feigned issue directed.
The substantial question of this case is, whether there was such
evidence of duress and fraud in the execution of the note as justified
its submission to the jury. The court below thought there was,
and submitted it accordingly. In this we think there was no error.
The circumstances which surrounded the old lady, and which
induced, or rather compelled, her to execute the paper in controversy,
were of an extraordinarily rough, impudent, and fraudulent
character.
VOL. XXX.-24
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As first executed, it was without consideration. The arrangement between Jordan and E. T. Elliott was that the latter was to
renew a former note, with his mother as surety, but instead of this,
and in face of the opposition of the (son, a note executed b.y the
mother alone was taken. Practically, this made little, or no difference, for, so far as we can gather from the evidence, E. T. Elliott
was insolvent; legally, however, it made the difference between some
consideration and no consideration. As the matter then stood,
there was simply the assumption by Mrs. Elliott of the debt of her
son without any consideration whatever.
The receipt, already referred to, supplies this defect by setting
forth the assignment to the defendant of her son's note and the
collateral life policy. But this transaction has an exceedingly
suspicious appearance. It was evidently an afterthought, and
designed to meet the omission of the day before.
This conclusion is strengthened by the false date which seems tc
have been intended to make the note and receipt appear as contemporaneous acts. When these facts are considered, together with
the circumstances under which it was obtained, we cannot but
regard the whole affair as one of gross fraud and imposition.
It was drawn by himself; he put into itwhat suited himself, not
only without her consent, but in spite of her protest that she
wanted nothing from him but his absence from her house, and on
his determined persistence, anxious only to be rid of the person oi
a man whom she. most justly bated and feared, at the same time
refusing to receive either the note or the policy, she put her name
to what he had written. What a mere mockery of justice to cal.
this paper the agreement of Mrs. Elliott!
The transaction of the preceding day, which produced the note
in question, was both scandalous and violent. Jordan's sudden
appearance in the hall of Mrs. Elliott's house; his tragic exclamation as though in soliloquy, "Perhaps this bitter cup may pass,'
when in the sitting-room, his rapid pacing back and forth with fierce
gesticulation. When pressed by the old lady to leave until the
next day, that she was at that time -not fit to do anything, he
answered by lifting up his hand and invoking the God of Heaven
to bear him witness that he would have the matter settled, or
forthwith prosecute her son. All these things were well calculated
to fill her with great fear, and the more so, as she had heard ibat
this man was one of great violence, and had threatened to shoot
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her son. But the fear thus produced was naturally much aggravated
by Jordan thrusting his fist in Edward's face, and ordering him to
keep quiet, when he attempted to interfere; for it thus became evident that Edward, instead of being able to protect his mother,
lacked the power or courage to protect even himself. Then, when
this Edward, the son, began to tell Jordan how he might have
defeated his collateral by taking his own life, the climax was reached;
then it was "the girls began to weep and cry," and the old lady
now ready, as she says, through terror and alarm to do anything
to put an end to this, as it appeared to her, frightful scene, signed
the note. Even in this act there occurred a circumstance which
shows the confusion of her mind, for she signed her maiden name, a
thing which, on observing, she declared she had never done before
since her marriage. This mistake was promptly corrected on Jordan's order to add the name "Elliott," and thus we have the signature " Olive Fox Elliott."
Jordan, having now accomplished his object, departs, but only,
as we have seen, to reappear the next day, in order to correct by
Mrs. Elliott's hand what he had neglected to accomplish the day
before, and to force upon her a valueless consideration, which she
refused to accept.
Now we are free to admit that, to a man of ordinary courage,
this fuss and fume of Jordan might have been regarded as a mere
farce, and would probably have been productive of a consequence
no more serious than a summary and unceremonious ejectment of
the intruder from the premises. But to this old lady, helpless as
she was, and unprepared either to encounter or deal with such sham
heroics, the matter was altogether different, and the jury were
justified in believing that she was much frightened, and that her
will was so controlled thereby that the obligation which she signed
was not her free and voluntary act.
We are aware that neither under the rule of the civil nor common law, as formerly expressed, would there be sufficient to release
Mrs. Elliott from her contract. For, according to Blackstone, the
threats to produce such an effect must be of such a character as to
induce a well-grounded fear in the mind of a firm and courageous
man of the loss of life or limb; and the rule of the civil law was
of like import; the fear must be of that kind which would influence
a man of the greatest constancy, 11T etus non vani hominis, sed
qui in homine constantissimo cadat." As we have already said,

JORDAN v. ELLIOTT.

the fantastic heroics of Jordan would not have been sufficient to
induce a courageous man to do that which he was not disposed;
hence, if this rule is to be applied to the case in hand, the defence
is insufficient. But, fortunately for the weak and timid, courts are
no longer governed by this harsh and inequitable doctrine which
seems to have considered only a very vigorous and athletic manhood, overlooking entirely women and men of weak nerves. Pothier
regards this rule as too rigid, and approves the better doctrine, that
regard must be had to the age, sex, and condition of the parties.
Since that fear, which would be insufficient to influence a man in
the prime of life and of military character, might be deemed
sufficient to avoid the contract of a woman or man in the decline
of life. (Evans's Poth. on Oblig. I. 18.) And we think the opinion
of Mr. Evans expresses the doctrine which is now approved by the
judicial mind, both of this country and of England, that is, that
any contract produced by actual intimidation ought to be held void,
whether, as arising from a result of merely personal infirmity, or
from circumstances which might produce a like effect upon persons
of ordinary firmness. Parsons, in his work on Contracts (Book I.,
p. 395), considers the rule now to be, that where the threat whether
of mischief to the person, property, or reputation, is such as to
destroy the threatened party's freedom of will, the law will not
enforce a contract executed under such a threat. This view of the
law has strong support in the case of Williams v. Bayley, Law
Rep., 1 H. L. Cas. 200. A son bad obtained money from a bank
on forged indorsements; on discovery, the bank officers insisted on
a settlement to which the father should be a party. He, knowing
the fact of the forgeries by his son, though there was no direut
threat of prosecution, yet, under this pressure, executed an agreement to mortgage his property, and the notes with the forged
indorsements were delivered to him. Held, the agreement was
invalid; Lord WrSTBURY, in his opinion, holding that there were
two reasons for refusing to enforce it: 1. That the defendant was
not in the execution thereof a free and voluntary agent. 2. That
the contract was illegal. In support of the first of these reasons,
he says, among other things, that the power of properly considering whether he ought or ought not thus to bind himself-whether
it is prudent so to do or not, is altogether taken away from a father
who is brought into the situation of either refusing and leaving his
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son in a perilous situation, or of taking upon himself the amount
of the obligation.
How aptly these authorities bear on the case in hand I need not
say, for any one who reads the evidence, will at once see that Mrs.
Elliott was so thoroughly overcome by fear, produced by the conduct of the plaintiff, that in the execution of the note in suit, she
was anything but a free and voluntary agent. Her sole object was
to free herself, on any terms, from the presence of her impudent
prosecutor, and to rescue her son from prosecution. Had.this man
insidiously gained the confidence of this old lady, and his lies
induced the signing of this obligation, as in Hunt v. HTioore, 2
Barr 105, it would, without any doubt or hesitation, have been
regarded as fraudulent and void, but how much less fraudulent is
that conduct, which produces the same result through fear? It
may, indeed, be the fear of a weak mind, but I cannot see how
that helps the matter; to the generous mind it is rather an aggravation. It is the weak that is the most easily imposed upon;
hence, the weak in an especial manner, need our protection.
In this, the main branch of this case, we discover no error in
the rulings of the court below. The 3d exception complains of the
allowance of the question to, and the answer of, the defendant as
to what she had heard of the plaintiff's reputation for violence.
This was altogether proper, not indeed, as proof of character, for
that was not in question; but as a circumstance affecting the defendant; as showing her conviction that she was dealing with a dangerous
man, whose will it would not be safe to resist. Again, in the 4th
specification, complaint is made that the court submitted the note to
the jury for construction, or rather, perhaps, as to the effect which
it would have as evidence. But it did nothing of the kind. The
language of the learned judge, which in this assignment is specially
emphasized, is this: "It is for you to say what is.sufficient to set
aside a paper of this kind. We do not determine this question for
you. It is not for us to say what would be sufficient to set it aside.
There might be circumstances which would justify the setting it
aside, and the question of the evidence and the effect of it are for
you and not for us." We would have to regard that jury as
extremely stupid that did not understand that the judge was here
talking about the weight of evidence, and what would or would not
be sufficient to overcome the prima facies of the paper itself, and
the whole answer, when taken together, makes this sufficiently plain.
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Previously, in answer to the plaintiff's point, the court had carefully
instructed the jury as to the legal force of this paper; that the
burden of proof was thrown upon the defendant, and that, in the
outstart, every presumption was against her. To this answer much
force is given by that to the plaintiff's second point, where the court
says: "This point we affirm. Where a written instrifment is
sought to be set aside for fraud or imposition, the proof which will
justify a jury in setting it aside, must be clear and satisfactory, and
it must be precise and indubitable."' With instructions so careful
as these, the jury could not have been misled by the language complained of, which, at best, is only ambiguous.
We discover nothing in the remaining exceptions which has not
been covered by what has been already said.
The judgment is affirmed.
In the note to the case of Wright v.
Remingtoa, 18 Am. Law Reg. (N. S)
743, 749, we took occasion to criticise
the decision of the learned court that decided that case, and remarked that,
although it had long been settled that a
man might avoid his acts: 1st. For fear
)f loss of life. 2d. Of loss of member.
3d. Of mayhem, or of great bodily
,njury. 4th. Of imprisonment; at the
nresent time it was doubtful whether the
doctrine ought to be confined within such
narrow limits, and that there seemed to
be a growing tendency in the courts of
this country to extend the old conmon
law rule so as to include many cases
which formerly would not have constituted duress; and, in conclusion, we
adopted as embodying our conception
of the law, the conclusions of Mr. W.
H. Phillips (14 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.)
201) : 1. " That any unlawful threats
amount to duress per minas, tufficient to
avoid a contract or agreement, if such
contract or agreement would not have
been entered into if the threats had not
been used ;" and, 2, " that the question
whether a contract or agreement was
entered into through fear, is a question
of fact, for the jury to decide in each
individual case; and that, therefore, it
would be erroneous for a judge to charge

as a principle of law, that the duress, in
order to avoid the obligation, must have
been such as was calculated to overcome
the will of a man of ordinary firmness
of mind."
In acley v. Headley, 21 Am. Law
Reg. (N. S.) 109, the Supreme Court
of Michigan laid down the rule that
" duress exists when one, by the unlawful act of another, is induced to make a
contract or perform some act under circumstances which deprive him of the
exercise of free will." The court, however, in that case, though laying down
what we believe to be the correct rule
upon the subject, held incorrectly, as it
seems to us, that no duress had been used.
It is unnecessary to repeat the authorities cited in the notes to those two cases.
Suffice it to say that though numerous
dicta showing the tendency of modern
judicial opinion may be found, the cases
wherein the more reasonable rule laid
down by Mr. Phillips has been directly
adopted as the rule of decision, are very
few. The case of Tapley v. Tapley, 10
Mfinn. 458, is an interesting and instructive case upon this question. In
that case substantially the same rule was
adopted as in the principal case, and
threats by a husband among other things
to abandon his wife, which she thought
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"would be a family scandal," clearly
threatening injury to her good name,
accompanied by general abusive treatment, were held to be duress so as to
avoid a deed executed by her under a
rcasonable apprehension that they would
be carried into effect.
The case of Tapley v. Tapley, above
cited, and the principal case are themost
satisfactory cases upon the subject under
consideration that have so far come to
oar notice, and the principal case is

especially valuable in that it meets the
question fairly and squarely and states
the principle that ought to govern such
cases in a clear and forcible manner. 'We
prophesy that it will become a leading
case in this branch of the law.
As to the threat that influenced the
action in question having been directed
against the defendant's son instead of her
personally, see Barris v. Carmody, 20
Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 663, and note.
M. D. EwELL.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
COYLE v. THE COMMONWEALTH.
Homicidal mania must be proved, not assumed, nor confounded with reckless
frenzy; To instruct, however, that it must be proved by " clearly preponderating
evidence" is -error. All the authorities require is that the evidence proving it
should "fairly" preponderate.
An attempt at suicide is not of itself evidence of insanity, and raises no legal
presumption thereof.

ERRoR to the court of Oyer and Terminer of York county.
MnEnci],

J., delivered the opinion of the court.

It was clearly proved that Coyle killed Emily Myers. That
fact is admitted. The only defence set up is that he was insane at
the time.
The first specification assigned for error is that in referring to
homicidal insanity the court cited approvingly a portion of the
language of Mr. Chief Justice GIBSoN, in Commonwealth v. Mioser,
4 Barr 264, in which it is said "there may be an unseen ligament
pressing on the mind, drawing it to consequences which it sees but
cannot avoid, and placing it under a coercion, which, while its
results are clearly perceived, is incapable of resistance. The
doctrine which acknowledges this mania is dangerous in its relations, and can be recognised only in the clearest cases. It ought
to be shown to have been habitual or at least so have evinced
itself in more than a single instance."
The able argument of counsel has failed to convince us that this
was not a correct declaration of the law, or that it has since been
ruled otherwise by this court.
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I The validity of such a defence is. admitted, but the existence of
such a form of mania must not be assumed without satisfactory
proof. Care must be taken not to confound it with acts of reckless
frenzy. When interposed as a defence to the commission of high
crime, its existence should be clearly manifest' Such defence is
based on an unsound state or condition of the mind proved by acts
and declarations of violence. It certainly is not requiring too
much to hold that it shall be shown in more than a single instance.
We know no later case in this state where the precise question has
been ruled otherwise.
The second specification relates to the effect which shall be given
to the attempt of the prisoner to take his own life. This attempt
was made immediately after he had fired the shots which caused the
death of his victim. The language objected to was not in answer
to any point submitted, but appears in the general charge. The
court said, "it appears proper to say to you, as a matter of law,
that even if you believe the prisoner really intended to take his
own life, this would not be of itself evidence of insanity. It would
only be a circumstance in the case to be considered by you in connection with other facts and circumstances, f6r the purpose of
enabling you to determine the mental condition of the prisoner.
The fact of the attempted suicide raises no presumption of
insanity."
The court was dealing with the question of attempted suicide
only, and whether that alone was exidence of insanity. It adopted
the very language used by the court below in American Life Ins.
Co. v. Assetts, and affirmea by this court in 24 P. F. Smith 176.
In Laros v. Commonwealth, 3 Norris 200, the defence was insanity.
It was objected that the court below said to the jury, "you can not,
however, infer insanity from the heinous, atrocious character of
the crime, or to constitute it as an element in the proof of actual
insanity." The answer here was, "the court did not mean to
say that where proof of insanity is given, the horrid and unnatural
character of the crime will lend no weight to the proof; but
meant only that the terrible nature of the crime will not stand
as the proof itself, or an element in the proof of the fact of
insanity. There is a manifest difference between that which
is actual evidence of a fact, and which merely lends weight to
the evidence which constitutes the proof. This is all the court
meant."
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So we understand the language used in the present case to mean
that the attempt to commit suicide, of itself, is not evidence of the
fact of the insanity of the prisoner, and it raises no legal presumption thereof, but it may be considered by the jury with all the
other facts and circumstances bearing on the question of insanity.
Sometimes it may be evidence of a wicked and depraved heart,
familiar with crime. At others, of despondency and discouragement; but perhaps more frequently of cowardice, of a lack of
courage to face ignominy and public disgrace, or to submit to the
punishment likely to be imposed on him.
The third specification presents more difficulty. In answer to a
point submitted, the court charged, "the law of the state is that
when the killing is admitted, and insanity or want of legal responsibility is alleged as an excuse, it is the duty of the defendant to
satisfy the jury that insanity actually existed at the time of the
act, and a d6ubt as to such insanity will not justify the jury in
acquitting on that ground. The law presumes sanity when an act
is done, and that presumption can only be overthrown by clearly
preponderating evidence." Excluding the last sentence, this
answer contains a clear and correct statement of the law. It is
not sufficient cause for an acquittal of one charged with crime, and
defending under the plea of insanity, that a doubt is raised as to
its existence. As sanity is presumed, when the fact of insanity is
alleged, it must be satisfactorily proved. Ortwein v. Commonwealth,
26 P. F. Smith 414; Lyjnch v. Same, 27 Id. 205. The question
remains, what degree of proof is necessary to overthrow the presumption of sanity ? The court said it can be "only by clearly
preponderating evidence." The court also (misled it is said by the
language in the brief furnished it) cited the case of Brown v. Commonwealth, 28 P. F. Smith 122, as declaring " to establish this
defence (viz., insanity) it must be clearly proved by satisfactory
and clearly preponderating evidence."
This is not the language of that case. It is demanding a higher
degree of proof than the authorities require. It may be satisfactorily proved by evidence which fairly preponderates. To require
it to "clearly preponderate" is practically saying it must be proved
beyond all doubt or uncertainty. Nothing less than this will make
it clear to the jury, and make them conclusively convinced. This is
not required to satisfy the jury: Heister v. Laird,1 W. & S.215.
It is not necessary that the evidence be so conclusive as to remove
VOL. XXX".-25
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all doubt: Ortwein v. Commonwealth, supra; Brown v. Same,
supra; Myers v. Same, 2 Norris 131; Parnell v. Same, 5 Id.
260. When one is on trial for his life care must be taken that he
receives fiom the court that due protection which the law has wisely
thrown around him. Evidence fairly preponderating is sufficient.
We discover no error in the fourth specification.
Judgment reversed and venire facias de novo awarded.
The question whether the burden of
proof rests on the Commonwealth in
criminal cases, where the defence of
insanity is interposed, has attracted considerable attention within the last few
years. The defence interposed in the
trial of Guiteau called public attention
to the subject, but it only served to bring
more prominently to the public notice
that which before had been a matter of
deep concern both to bench and bar.
Within the last year or two there have
been a number of decisions on this inportant subject rendered by the courts
of last resort, and the question involved is
of such a nature that it may be worth
while to ascertain the exact status of the
matter at the present time.
Three different theories have beit
maintained in relation to this subject.
First, it has been held that inasmuch as
every man is presumed to be sane, the
burden of proof will rest on the defendant to overcome the presumption by a
clear preponderance of the evidence.
In other words he must establish his
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
This theory, whatever may have been
thought of it at one time, is now regarded
almost universally as entirely unjustifiable, inhuman, and absurd. At one
time it was supported by the courts of
Alabama, Delaware, Missouri and New
Jersey: Brinyea v. State, 5 Ala. 241 ;
State v. Danby, 1 Houston Cr. Cas.
(Del.) 175 ; State v. Pratt, Id. 269 ;
State v. Boice, Id. 355 ; State v. Draper,
Id. 531; State v. T"omas, Id: 511 ;
State v. Huting, 21 Mo. 464; State v.
Spencer, I Zabriskie (N. J.) 201. But
this doctrine has been overruled in

Alabama and Missouri, as we shall hereafter see. In Delaware the doctrine does
not appear to have been abandoned.
The case in New Jersey, although it has
found its way into the regular reports,
is not a decision of the court of last
resort, but a mere charge to the jury
given by Chief Justice HoRInDLwOn

in the Hudson County Oyer and Terminer, in 1846. The question has never
been decided by either the Supreme Court
or the Court of Appeals.
The second theory, and the one most
generally adhered to, is that announced
in the principal case. That inasmuch as
every man is presumed to be sane, the
presumption of sanity prevails necessarily
until it is shown to be false by a prepon,derance of evidence. That the burden
of proof rests on the prisoner to show
his insanity to the satisfaction of the
jury by a preponderance of the evidence.
This theory is maintained in Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas
and Virginia-thirteen States.
Alabama: This theory was adopted in
this state in a very elaborate opinion,
ii 1879, in Boswell v. State. 63 Ala.
307. "1Isanity is a defence which must
be proven to the satisfaction of the jury,
by that measure of proof which is required in civil causes ; and a reasonable
doubt of sanity, raised by all the evidence, does not authorize an acquittal."
See McAllister v. State, 17 Ala. 434;
Brinyea v. State, 5 Id. 241 ; State v.
Marer, 2 Id. 43.
Arkansas: The question as to the
burden of proof in such cases was briefly
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alluded to, in 1870, in McKenzie v.
State, 26 Ark. 334, 341. It was said
that the prisoner must produce evidence
sufficient to change the presumption raised
against him by the proof of the killing.
California: In People v. Wreden, 12
Rep. 682 (1881), the Supreme Court
again announced its adhesion to the
theory we are considering, having previously adopted it in cases cited below.
In that case, as in the particular case,
the court considered the effect of an
instruction that the prisoner must prove
his insanity by a clear preponderance
of the evidence. It said: "Is not the
expression I clearly established by satisfactory proof,' the full equivalent of
'established by satisfactory proof beyond
a reasonable doubt?' How can a fact
be said to be clearly established so long
as there is a reasonable doubt whether it
has been established at all ? There can
be no reasonable doubt of a fact after it
has been clearly established by satisfactory proof." And see People v. Coffman, 24 Cal. 233; People v. McDonnell,
47 Id. 134; People v. Wilson, 49 Id.
14; People v. Messersnzith, 57 Id. 575.
Iowa: The court holds that the presumption of sanity cannot be avoided
except by a preponderance of proof, the
defence of insanity being an affirmative
defence. But it need not be made out
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the preponderance of the evidence shows the
insanity of the defendant, it raises a
reasonable doubt of his guilt; State v.
Pelter, 32 Iowa 49 (1871). This theory,
said the court, is in accord with the
weight of authority, and has the support
of reason, humanity and public policy.
Kentucky : This too is the rule adopted
in Kentucky. A mere doubt of sanity
is insufficient to rebut the 'presumption
of sanity. That presumption must be
rebutted by a preponderance of evidence,
but if the evidence preponderates,.the
jury are not to convict "merely because
they might entertain a rational doubt"
as to his insanity: Kriel v. Common-

wealth, 5 Bush 362 (1869) ; Graham v.
Commonwealth, 16 B. Mon. 587; Smith
v. Commonwealth, 1 Duval 224.
Maine: In State v. Lawrence, 57 Me.
574 (1870), is to be found an able presentation of the theory that the burden
rests with the prisoner to establish his
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. " Sanity is assumed and treated
as an essential attribute of humanity.
The indictment follows the statute, setting out all the acts deemed essential to
the crime, but omitting all reference
to the capacity of the accused. Of all
that is set out in the indictment he is
presumed innocent, and that must be
proved and nothing else. When that is
proved he is convicted, unless he interposes some defence other than a sane
denial of the allegations against him.
A simple plea of not guilty, puts in issue
the allegations, and only the allegations
in the indictment, and as to them the
prosecution has the affirmative. * * *
The plea of insanity is, and of necessity
must be, a plea of confession and avoidance. * * * It does not meet any question propounded by the indictment, but
raises one outside of it. It is not a mere
denial, but a positive allegation."
presumption
Massachusetts: "The
must be rebutted by proof of the contrary, satisfactory to the jury." Such
proof may come from the testimony of
the state, or from testimony presented by
the defence: Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7
Met. 500 ; Commonwealthv. Eddy, 7 Gray
583; Commonwealthv. Heath, 11 Id. 303.
Missouri : Such is now the law in this
state: State v. Klinger, 43 Mo. 127 ;
State v. Smith, 53 Id. 267 ; State v.
.Redemefer, 71 Id. 173; State v. Erb, 74
Id. 199.
North Carolina: The jury is to be
of the prisoner's insanity:
"satisfied"
State v. Payne, 86 N. C. 609 (1882) ;
Moreheadv. Brown, 6 Jones (Law) 366.
Ohio : Such is the law of this state as
determined in 1857, and since adhered
to : Loefner v. State, 10 Ohio St. 598;
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Bond v. State, 23 Id. 349; Bergin v.
State, 31 Id, 115.
Pennsylvania: The doctrine in the
particular case as to the burden of proof
is clearly established by a series of cases :
Ortwein v. Commonwealth, 76 Penn. St.
423 (1874) ; Lynch v. Commonwealth, 77
Id. 205 (1874); Meyers v. Commonwealth, 83 Id. 141 (1876) ; Pannell v.
Commonwealth, 86 Id. 268 (1878);
Sayres v. Commonwealth, 88 Id. 301
(1879).
Texas : The Court of Appeals declines
to say upon whom the burden of proof
lies when the defence of insanity is interposed. "We do not deem it necessary
or incumbent upon us to unravel or
attempt to answer the misty mazes and the
metaphysical disquisitions indulged by
the opposing theorists about sanity being
essential to criminal intent, and criminal
intent being essential to punishable crime,
nor their equally abstruse and obscure
views as to which side has the burden
of proof when the sanity of the defendant, from whatever cause, acquires a
status in the case."
The court holds
that "the evidence of insanity, to warrant an acquittal, should be sufficiently
clear to convince the minds and consciences of the jury :" Webb v. State, 9
Tax. Ct. of App. 490 (1880); King v.
State, Id. 553 ; Johnson v. State, 10 Id.
577 (1881) ; Clar v. State, 8 Id. 350
(1880) ; Carter v. State, 12 Texas 500
(1854).
But in a case just decided in
the Court of Appeals it is laid down that
the burden is on the prisoner in such
cases to establish his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence: Jones v.
State, 15 Reporter 27, 28 (January 3d
1883).
Virginia: The prisoner must prove
his insanity to the satisfaction of the
jury: Boswell's Case, 20 Gratt. 860;
Baccigalupo's Case, 33 Id. 807. But he
need not prove it beyond reasonable
doubt: Dfarnette v. Commonwealth, 75
Va. 867.
The third and last theory is that the

burden of proof rests on the State to
prove the sanity of the prisoner. The
presumption of sanity will be indulged
in the absence of evidence to the contrary. if the defendant introduces no
evidence which tends to prove insanity,
the presumption stands. But if he gives
evidence tending to overthrow the presumption of his sanity, casting doubt and
uncertainty upon it, it is the duty of the
state by affirmative evidence to prove
his sanity beyond a doubt. This theory
is maintained by courts of the very
highest standing, and has received the
emphatic approval of some of our ablest
and most enlightened judges. The
reasoning of the opinions in which this
conclusion has been reached seems to the
writer to be entirely logical, and in
harmony with that humane and wise
requirement of the law that every man
shall be presumed innocent until his guilt
has been shown beyond a reasonable
doubt. The question may well beasked,
"1How can a jury say, ' We have no
doubt of the guilt of the prisoner, but
we do doubt whether he was sane ?' "
This theory is maintained in Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi,
N ebraska, New Hampshire and New
York and Tennessee-nine States.
Illinois: In a case decided in 1859 it
was held that the burden of provinginsanity rested on the prisoner : Fisher's Case,
23 Ill. 293. But in 1863. that case was
overruled, and was declared to have been
decided under peculiar circumstances not
admitting of much deliberation. The
presumption of innocence was declared
to be as strong as the presumption of
sanity: Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 385.
Sanity is as essential an ingredient of
crime as the overt act. If the evidence
raises a doutt of the prisoner's sanity
the burden is on the prosecution to remove
that doubt: Chase v. People, 40 Ill.
352.

Indiana: If the prisoner raises a
reasonable doubt as to his sanity, it is
necessary for the state to prove mental
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soundness beyond a reasonable doubt.
This theory was adopted and has been
adhered to since 1862: Polk v. State,
19 Ind. 170; Stevens v. People, 31 Id.
485 ; Gueting v. State, 66 Id. 94.
Kansas : The same theory was adopted
in 1873 by the able court of this state
in a well reasoned opinion. The sanity
of the prisoner "ought to be made out"
said the court, "in the same way, by
the same party, and by evidence of the
same kind and degree, and as conclusive
in its character, as is required in making
oat any other essential fact, ingredient,
or element of murder." State v. Crawford, 11 Kaus. 32.
Michigan : One of the most satisfactory opinions maintaining this theory is
that pronounced by the Supreme Court
of this state in the case of the People v.
Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9. The opinion was
by Chief Justice CooLEr,.
After showing that the crime of murder is only
committed when a person of sound mind
and discretion unlawfully kills another
with malice, express or implied, the court
declares that the prosecution takes upon
itself he burden of establishing not only
the killing, but the malicious intent.
"There is no such thing in law as a
separation of the ingredients of the
offence so as to leave a part to be established by the prosecution, while as to the
rest the defendant takes upon himself
the burden of proving a negative. The
idea that the burden of proof shifts in
these cases is unphilosopbical, and at war
with fundamental principles of criminal
law. The presumption of innocence is
a shield to the defendant throughout the
proceedings, until the verdict of the jury
establishes the fact that beyond a reasonable doubt lie not only committed the
act, but that lie did so with malicious
intent." The same doctrine was affirmed
in People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482.
Mississippi : The subject was carefully
considered in this state in 1879, in Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 272. The
opinion delivered is an able presentation

of the theory we are considering. After
stating that there can be no crime without mental accountability, the court
declares, that it fails to see any consistency or logic in holding that the state
must establish all the elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, with
the exception of the prisoner's sanity,
" But it is said that the law presumes
sanity. So the law presumes malice
from the fact of killing; but if anything
in the testimony, either of the state or
of the defendant, suggests a reasonable
doubt of its existence, nobody ever supposed that the state could stop short of
removing this doubt, and of establishing
his malice to a moral certainty."
Nebraska: This theory was adopted in
this state in 1876 : Wright v. People, 4
Neb. 408.

New Hampshire : And in this state it
was maintained as early as 1861, and
has since been adhered to: State v.
Bartlett, 43 N. H. 224 ; State v. Jones,
50 Id. 369, 400.

New York: Whatever doubt was supposed to exist as to the law of this state
on this question was effectually put to
rest by the recent decision of the Court
of Appeals, in 0' Connell v. People, 87
N. Y. 380. In that case it is said that
the prosecution must satisfy the jury
"upon the whole evidence that the
prisoner was mentally responsible; for
the affirmation of the issue tendered by
the indictment remained with the prosecution to tile
end of the trial."
The presumption of sanity stands until repelled.
If the prisoner gives no evidence as to
his insanity, the presumption stands,
but if he gives evidence tending to overthrow the presumption the prosecution
must produce answering testimony., See
Moett v. People, 85 N. Y. 373; People
v. MJcCann, 16 N. Y. 58.
Tennessee : As we understand the
decision in Dove v. State, 3 Heisk. 348
(1872), thie theory we are considering is
practically adopted in that sate. The
presumption of sanity is sufficient in the
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absence of any evidence of insanity.
If evidence of insanity is introduced and
is sufficient to make an equipoise, then
the presumption of sanity is neutralized,
and the burden devolves on the state to
show the sanity of the defendant.
In addition to the cases we have noted
there are decisions in Connecticut and in
Minnesota which announce that the burden of proving insanity is on the prisoner.
But these decisions are silent as to
whether he must prove his insanity by a
clear preponderance, or only by a mere
preponderance of the evidence: State v.
Hoyt, 46 Conn. 330, 337 ; s. c. 47 Id.

51§ ; Bonfanti v. State, 2 Minn. 123;
State v. Gut, 13 Id. 341.
In a case in Georgia, in 1872, the
Supreme Court of that state said:
"Prima facie all persons are to be considered sane ; and this is true in criminal
as well as civil trials. If this be the
legal presumption, it would seem to
follow that unless the jury are satisfied
of insanity, they must consider the prisoner sane. Perhaps the word satisfied
is rather strong; and were there any
evidence here of insanity, we might
hesitate to sustain the judge:" Holsenbake v. State, 45 Ga. 55.
HENRY WADE ROGERS.

Supreme Court of the United States.
TURNER v. STATE OF MARYLAND.
In order to constitute an inspection law, within the meaning of art. 1, sect. 10,
of the Constitution of the United States, it is not necessary that the statute should
provide for an inspection of the quality of the article to be exported, and the fact
that the inspection provided for extends only to the form and dimensions of the
package does not render the statute unconstitutional.
A state may lawfully, by such inspection law, require the articles to be brought
to state warehouses to be inspected.
It may also direct that a certain product, before it becomes an article of commerce
between the states, shall be encased in a package of certain form or dimensions,
and the imposition upon such article, when exported, of a tax to meet the expenses
of inspection is not an unlawful discrimination between the state buyer and the
purchaser who buys for exportation.
Whether it is not exclusively the province of Congress to decide whether a charge
or duty under an inspection law is excessive, quinre.
Certain state statutes provided that no tobacco, the growth of the state, should
be passed or accounted lawful tobacco unless packed in hogsheads of a specified
size ; that inspectors should be appointed whose duty it should be to examine the
hogsheads of tobacco brought to the warehouse to which they should he respectively
assigned; to stamp on each hogshead its weight and the weight of the tobacco; to
open it and take from it samples, and, if the tobacco is merchantable, to deliver it
sealed to the owner, with a certificate. The statute imposed on each hogshead
a charge of $2 outage, if it weighed less than 1100 pounds, and 12 cents for every
additional hundred pounds, and prohibited, under a penalty, any one from carrying
out of the state tobacco raised in the state unless such tobacco should have been so
inspected. The statute further provided that nothing therein contained should prohibit a grower or purchaser of tobacco, who should pack the same in the county
where grown, from exporting it without having it opened for inspection, but that
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such tobacco should be marked with the name and residence of the owner, and
should be liable to the same charge of outage and storage. Held, that this statute
was an inspection law of the state, and not in violation of sect. 10, art. 1, of the
Constitution of the United States.
WRIT of Error to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Turner, the plaintiff in error, had been indicted in the Criminal Oburt
of Baltimore for exporting tobacco without having it inspected under
the inspection laws of Maryland, and paying the charges therefor. He
demurred to the indictment, and by agreement the demurrer was overruled pro forma, and the case submitted to the court, which thereupon
gave judgment against Turndr, and imposed a fine of $300. The Court
of Appeals of Maryland affirmed this judgment and Turner thereupon
took this writ of error, alleging the state inspection laws to be in violation of section 10, of article 1, of the Constitution of the United States,
prohibiting any state from laying any duties on exports except what
might be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.
Chapter 346 of the laws of Maryland of 1864, provides (sect. 1)
for the appointment of five tobacco inspectors, one for each state tobacco
warehouse in the city of Baltimore. By sect. 5 each tobacco inspector
is required to employ such clerks and laborers, and provide and keep on
hand such books, implements and materials, as may be necessary for the
economical and effective discharge of his duties. Sect. 10 is as follows :
" It shall be the duty of each tobacco inspector to cause each hogshead
of tobacco landed or delivered at the warehouse to which he is appointed,
to be numbered in succession as received, and to cause said number to
be entered in a book kept for that purpose, together with the time said
hogshead was received, the name of the vessel or other conveyance, if
known to him, by which said hogshead was brought to the city of Baltimore, and of the owner or consignee of said tobacco, and the initials
or other marks on said hogshead, identifying the same; and, when said
hogshead shall be removed from said warehouse, he shall cause an entry
to be made, in some book kept for that purpose, of the time when the
same was so removed, the name of the person to whom the same was
delivered, and of the vessel or other conveyance by which the same
was taken away."
It is provided by sect. 13 that each inspector shall
cause each hogshead of tobacco, before it is uncased, to be weighed, and
the tobacco in each hogshead and the cask itself to be separately weighed,
and the weight of each hogshead, as first weighed, and the gross and
net weight of the tobacco therein contained, after inspection, to be
entered in a proper book, and by sect. 14 that he shall mark on each
hogshead, its warehouse number and weight, and the net weight of
tobacco contained therein, and its warehouse number, and, by succeeding sections, that he shall unease and break all tobacco, in whatever
state raised, and draw samples from eaph hogshead, and tie each lot of
samples together, and label it with the warehouse number of the hogshead, and the number of the warehouse, and the date of inspection,
and the name of its owner, if known, or, the initials or other marks on
the hogshead, and deliver it sealed, if the tobacco be merchantable, to
the owner, with a certificate stating the date of inspection, the warehouse mark and number of the hogshead, the weight thereof and the
net weight of the tobacco in it, and that unmerchantable tobacco shall
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be re-conditioned, packed, re-weighed and re-inspected, and then sampled
and certified; and by sect. 27 that every hogshead shall be liable to the
charge of $1.50 outage, if weighing less than 1100 pounds, and to 15
cents additional for e.vcry 100 pounds, which shall be paid by the purchaser thereof to the inspector, before it is removed. Penalties are
imposed by sect. 40 for erasing, altering or adding to any mark placed
by the inspector on any hogshead or any label of any sample, and for
fraudulently taking any tobacco from a sample or substituting other tobacco for any in such sample, and for counterfeiting any inspector's
certificate or seal. Section 41 is as follows: "After the passage of this
act, it shall not be lawful to carry out of this state, in hogsheads, any
tobacco raised in this state, except in hogsheads which shall have been
inspected, passed and marked agreeably to the provisions of this act,
unless such tobacco shall have been inspected and passed before this act
goes into operation ; and any person violating the provisions of this
section shall forfeit and pay the sum of three hundred dollars, which
may be recovered in any court of law of this state, and which shall go
to the credit of the tobacco fund." This section was amended by chapter 291 of the laws of 1870, by re-enacting it with the following addition : "provided, that nothing herein contained shall be construed, to
prohibit any grower of tobacco, or any purchaser thereof, who may pack
the same in the county or neighborhood where grown, from exporting
or carrying out of this state any such tobacco without having the same
opened for inspection ; but such tobacco so exported or carried out of
this state without inspection shall in all cases be marked with the name
in full of the owner thereof, and the place of residence of such owner,
and shall be liable to the same charge of outage and storage as in other
cases, and any person who shall carry or send out of this state any such
tobacco, without having it so marked, shall be subject to the penalty
prescribed by this section." Section 42 prescribes the size of the casks
in which tobacco raised in Mlaryland shall be packed, and forbids the
inspector to inspect or pass it until packed in a hogshead of proper
dimensions.
By chapter 36 of the laws of 1872, some additional regulations and
some changes were made and by sect. 26, it was provided: "no tobacco
of the growth of this state shall be passed or accounted lawful tobacco
unless the same be packed in hogsheads not exceeding fifty-four inches
in length of the staves, nor exceeding forty-six inches across the head,
and the owner, or his agent, of tobacco packed in any hogshead of
greater dimensions shall repack the same in hogsheads of the size herein prescribed, at his own expense, before the same shall be passed."
By chapter 228 of the laws of 1872, the charge for outage is fixed
at $2 for every hogshead not exceeding 1100 pounds, and 12J cents
additional on every 100 pounds over 1100 pounds, to be paid by the
shipper of the tobacco, or his agent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BLATCOFHORD, J.-In

order to determine whether the statutory pro-

visions in question are obnoxious to the objection made, their meaning
must be ascertained. The Act of 1864 requires the inspector to examine
the hogshead to ascertain whether it is of the required dimensions, and
then to inspect the tobacco itself by sampling the contents, and, when
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this has been dbone, and the weight ascertained, the hogshead is passed.
In regard to the addition made by the Act of 1870, chapter 291, to sect.
41 of the Act of 1864, the grower or purchaser of tobacco packed in the
county or neighborhood where it is grown is permitted to export the same
without having the hogshead opened for inspection by sampling its contentsL, but the act requires such hogshead to be marked with the name
and residefcc of the owner, and it is made liable to the charge of outage
as in other cases, and any one violating its provisions is subjected to the
penalty imposed by section 41 of the Act of 1864. The Act of 1870,
in thus permitting the grower or purchaser of tobacco packed in the
county or neighborhood where it is grown, to export the same without
having the hogshead opened for inspection, does not dispense with any
other xequiremcnt of the Act of 1864 in regard to inspection. It provides, in express terms, that each hogshead thus packed shall be marked
with the name and residence of the owner. It is necessary, therefore,
that some one shall ascertain whether these requirements have been
complied with and whether the tobacco was, in fact, the growth of the
county or neighborhood where it was packed. It also requires that such
tobacco shall be liable to the same charge of outage as in other cases,
and,'as the charge of outage depends upon the weight of the hogshead,
it is necessary that some one shall ascertain the weight of such hogshead,
in order to determine the amount to be paid. It does not change or in
any manner dispense with the statutory requirements in regard to the
dimensions of the hogshead in which such tobacco is to be packed, and
it is necessary that some one shall see that these requirements are complied with. These and other duties, -it
is obvious, are to be performed
by the inspectors, and when they are performed the hogshead is to be
passed and marked as provided by the Act of 1864. When the words
"such tobacco so exported or carried out of this state without inspection"
are read in connection with the preceding sentence, which permits the
grower or purchaser to export such tobacco "without having the same
opened for inspection," it is clear that the term 4' without inspection"
refers to inspection by opening the hogshead and sampling the contents.
The Act of 1872, chapter 36, ehanges some of the provisions of the
Act of 1864, omits others, and in express terms repeals all acts or parts
of acts inconsistent with its provisions. The penal clause of the Act of
1864, as amended by the Act of 1870, which makes it unlawful to carry
out of the state in hogsheads tobacco raised in the state, except in hogsheads inspected, passed and marked according to the provisions of the
acts, is omitted in the Act of 1872 ; but there is nothing, either in the
title or the general frame-work of the act, or in the manner in which the
subject-matter is dealt with, to justify the conclusion that the legislature
intended the Act of 1872 as a substitute for all prior legislation on the
subject. The provisions of such prior laws are essential to give completeness to the system of which the Act of 1872 is but a part. That does
not, it is true, make it unlawful to export tobacco raised in the state
unless the same shall have been inspected and passed, but it does provide that no tobacco, the growth of the state, shall be passed or accounted
lawful tobacco unless the same be packed in hogsheads of certain prdscribed dimensions. It does not say, in so many words, that the tobacco
raised in the state and intended for exportation shall be delivered at one
of the state tobacco warehouses, but it does provide for the appointment
VOL. vXX.-26
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of inspectors of tobacco, clerks and other oficials, with fixed salaries,
and assigns them to the tobacco warehouses, with no duty to perform
unless it be the inspection of tobacco. In thus declaring that no tobacco,
the growth of the state, shall be accounted lawful tobacco unless packed
in the manner prescribed by the act, it is plain the legislature meant it
to be the duty of the inspectors appointed by the act to ascertain
whether such tobacco was thus packed in conformity with the requirements of the statute, and this they could not do unless such tobacco
should be delivered at the state tobacco warehouses. The legislature
meant, and only meant, to select certain provisions from the public local
law in relation to the inspection of tobacco, and to re-enact these in a
public general law, and to leave such portion of the local law which it
did- not thus re-enact and did not modify or repeal by inconsistent provisions, as existing parts of the local law. The Act of 1872 did not
modify or repeal section 41 of the Act of 1864, as modified by the Act
of 1870, which constituted part of the local law; and under that section it was the duty of the plaintiff in error to have delivered the
tobacco packed by him at one of the state tobacco warehouses, in order
that the inspectors might ascertain whether it was packed in hogsheads
of the proper dimensions, and whether it was packed in the county or
neighborhood where it was grown, and marked as the statute directed.
The legislature did not intend that merely marking the name of the
grower or purchaser on the hogshead should release such grower or purchaser from the other requirements of the act. These views are those
which were held by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in its opinion
delivered in this case. (55 Maryland 240.) The result is, that all
that the Act of 1870 does in regard to a grower or purchaser of tobacco
raised in Maryland, who packs the same in hogsheads in the county or
neighborhood where such tobacco is grown, and who exports it or carries
it out of the state, is to dispense with the opening of subh hogsheads
for inspection, but that it does not dispense with any other requirement
of the Act of 1864 in regard to inspection ; and that it is a part of such
inspection for the inspector to see that the hogshead is marked with the
name and place of residence of the owner, and to verify the claimed fact
that the tobacco was raised in Maryland and packed in the county or
neighborhood where it was grown, and to weigh the hogshead in order
to determine the charge for outage, and to see that the hogshead conforms in dimensions to the requirement of the statute, so that the tobacco
may be passed and accounted lawful tobacco. It is also apparent, that
not until the above and other duties have been performed by the inspectors can the hogshead be passed and marked as required by the Act
of 1864. This requires, in regard to the hogsheads specially mentioned
in the proviso enacted in 1870 to section 41 of the Act of 1864, that
they be delivered at one of the state tobacco warehouses, and that the
provisions of section 10 of the Act of 1864 be observed, that is, that
the inspector shall number each hogshead in succession, and enter the
number in a book, with the time the hogshead is received, and the name,
if known, of the conveyance by which it was brought to Baltimore, and
the name of the owner or consignee of the tobacco, and the initials or
other marks on the hogshead identifying it, and, on its removal, enter
in a book the time of removal, and the name of the person to whom it
is delivered, and of the conveyance by which it is taken away; that,
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under sect. 12 of the Act of 1864, it shall be inspected in all required
particulars except opening it; that, under sect. 13 of that act, the
inspector shall weigh the hogshead unopened and enter such weight in
a book, with sufficient reference to its marks and numbers as previously
recorded; that, under sect. 14 of that act, the inspector shall mark with
a marking iron, on the side of each hogshead, its warehouse number
and weight, and on each head its warehouse number; and that not until
these things have been done is the tobacco to be passed or accounted as
lawful tobacco.
The plaintiff in error contends that section 41 of the Act of 1864,
as re-enacted by the Act of 1870, violates the Constitution of the United
States, because (1) it is a regulation of inter-state and foreign comnierce, and a law levying a duty on exports, and does not fall within
the class of laws known as inspection laws, because the proviso enacts
that the tobacco to which it refers need not be opened for inspection ;
(2).said section, even though it is an inspection statute, discriminates
against the non-resident buyer and manufacturer of leaf tobacco, and
ir favor of the State buyer and manufacturer, in imposing burdensome
regulations on tobacco intended for export, and laying a tax of at least
two dollars a hogshead on such tobacco when exported, while tobacco
manufactured within the State is free from such regulations and such
tax, and thus it discriminates against inter-state aud foreign commerce
in tobacco, and in favor of local manufacturers and the internal trade
of the State; (3) said section discriminates between different classes
of exporters of tobacco, in that it permits tobacco exported by persons
who pack it in the county or neighborhood where it is grown, to be
exported when marked with the full name and residence of the owner,
without inspection other than the examination of the outsides of the
hogsheads, while exporters of another class must have the contents of
their hogsheads subjected to examination.
The provisions of the Constitution of the United States alleged to be
violated are clause two of section ten of article one, before quoted, and
that clause of section eight of article one which provides that the Congress shall have power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several States."
The Maryland court held that the charge of outage in this case was
an inspection duty, within the meaning of the Coustitution; that the
State had the power to prescribe the dimensions of the hogshead in
which tobacco raised in Maryland shall be packed, and to require such
hogshead to be delivered at one of the State tobacco warehouses, in
order that the inspectors may ascertain whether it conforms to the
requirements of the law, and whether it is the true growth of the State
and packed by the grower or purchaser in the county or neighborhood
where it was grown; and that the charge of outage, to reimburse the
State for the expenses thereby incurred, and in consideration of storage
of the hogshead, is in the nature of an inspection duty, within the
meaning of the Constitution.
The contention of the plaintiff in error is, that a law which otherwise would be an inspection law ceases to be such if no provision is
made for opening the package containing the article and examining the
quality of its contents. On this subject the Maryland court held, that,
in order to constitute an inspection law, an examination of the quslity
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of the article itself is not necessary, but that to prepare the products
of a State for exportation it may be necessary that such products should
be put in packages of a certain form, and of certain prescribed dimensions, either on account of the nature and character of such products,
or to enable the State to identify the products of its growth, and to
furnish the evidence of such identification in the markets to which they
are exported. In opposition to these views, which appear to us to be
sound, we are asked to hold that the provisions under consideration do
not fall under the head of inspection laws, in a case where the question
is presented without any finding of any facts to show that what may
be thus necessary in regard to a product is not necessary in regard to
tobacco, and with every presumption to the contrary arising out of the
course of legislation as to the inspection of tobacco, by the State of
Maryland. The legislature of the State of Maryland, from the earliest
history of the colony and since the formation of the State government,
has made the inspection of tobacco raised in that State compulsory.
That inspection has included many features, and has extended to the
form, size and weight of the packages containing the tobacco, as well
as to the quality of the article. Fixing the identify and weight of
tobacco alleged. to have been grown in the State, and thus preserving
the reputation of the article in markets outside of the State, is a legitimate part of inspection laws, and the means prescribed therefor in the
statutes in question naturally conduce to that end. Such provisions, as
parts of inspection laws, are as proper as provisions for inspecting quality,
and it cannot be said that the absence of the latter provisions, in respect
to any particular class of tobacco, necessarily causes the laws containing
the former provisions to. cease to be inspection laws. It is easy to see
that the use of the precaution of weighing and marking the weight on
the hogshead and recording it in a book is to enable it to be determined
at any time whether the contents have been diminished subseqiiently
to the original packing, by comparing a new weight with the original
marked weight, or, if the marked weight be altered, with the weight
entered in the warehouse book. The things required to be done in
respect to the hogshead of tobacco in the present case, aside from any
inspection of quality, are to be done to prepare and fit the hogshead, as
a unit, containing the tobacco, for exportation, and for becoming an
article of foreign commerce or commerce among the States, and are to
be done before it becomes such an article. They are properly parts of
inspection laws, within the definition given by this court in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 203. In a note to the argument of Mr. .Emmet in
that case; at page 139, are collected references to many statutes of the
States, in the form of inspection laws, showing what features have been
generally recognised as falling within the domain of those laws-such
as the size of barrels or casks, and the number of hoops on them; what
pieces of beef or pork, and what quantity and size of nails, should be
in one cask; the length, breadth and thickness of staves and heading,
lumber, boards, shingles, &c.; and the branding of pot and pearl ashes,
flour, fish and lumber, and the forfeiture of them, if unbranded. These
were cited as instances of the exercise by States of the power to act
upon an article grown or produced in a State, before it became an article
of foreign or domestic commerce, or of commerce among the States, to
prepare it for such purpose. It was in reference to laws of this character
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that it was said, in argument, in Gibbons v. Ogden, that the enactments
seemed arbitrary, and were not founded on the ideb. that the things the exportation of which was thus prohibited or restrained ware dangerous or
noxious, but had for their object to improve foreign trade and raise the
character and reputation of the articles in a foreign market. It was in
reference to such laws, among other inspection laws, that Chief Justice
MARSHALL, in Gibbons v. Ogden (page 203), after remarking that a
power to regulate commerce was not the source from which a right to
pass inspection laws was derived, said: "The object of inspection laws is
t) improve the quality of articles produced by the labor of a country;
t,fit them for exportation; or, it may be, for domestic use. They act
upon the subject before it becomes an article of foreign commerce, or
of commerce among the States, and prepare it for that purpose. They
form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general
government; all which can be most advantageously exercised by the
States themselves." It was not suggested by the court that those particular laws were not valid exercises of the power of the State to fit
the articles for exportation, or that in addition to, or even aside from,
ascertaining the quality of the article produced in a State, the State
could not define the form of tile lawful package or its weight, and subject form and weight, with or without quality, to the supervision of an
inspector, to ascertain that the required conditions in respect to the
article were observed.
In addition to the instances cited in Gibbons v. Ogden, the diligence
of the attorney-general of the State of 'Maryland has collected and presented to us; in argument, numerous instauces,1 showing, by the text
The following are the acts, and the subjects in reference to which they were
passea. New HEampshfre: Casks of flaxseed, 1785. See Perpetual. Laws of New
Hampshire, 1789, p. 193. Dimensions of shingles, staves and hoops. Ibid. p. 188.
Mlassaclusetts: Shingles, staves and hoops. Acts and Resolves of the Province of
Mass. Bay, vol. 3 [1742-1756], p. 128, etseq., chap. 22. Size of casks for pickled
fish. Ibid. p. 1000. Act of 1757. Rdode Island: Regulating the inspection of
beef, pork, pickled fish and tobacco, and ascertaining the assize of casks, clapboards, shingles, boards, &c. Public Laws of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, ed. 1798, pp. 509, 512, 522. Connecticut: Statutes of Conn., ed. 1786.
For ascertaining the assize of casks used for liquor, beef, pork and fish, pp. 18, 312.
There were sworn packers of tobacco, whose duty it was to brand casks. New
York : Laws, ed. 1789. All flour for exportation to be packed in casks of a certain
size and make. No flour to be exported without having been inspected. 1785,
chap. 35, p. 197. No pot or pearl ashes to be exported before inspection. New
Jersey: Capacity of meat barrels. Act of April 6th 1676. Leaming and Spicer,
p. 116. Capacity of barrels, Ibid. p. 120 ; bricks, Ibid. 459 ; barrels, Ibid. 508 ;
Assize of bread, Ibid. 545, 546, 547. Size of casks, Act of 1725. Staves, hoops,
shingles, &c., Act of September 26th 1772. Size of casks, Act of September 26th
1772. Pennsylva zia: Laws of Penn, A. J. Dallas, 1797. Dimensions of casks for
beer, ale, pork, beef, &c., p. 27, etseq. Dimensions of staves, headings, boards and
timber. Ibid. 380. Flour casks-how to be made and dimensions of. Ibid. 452.
Act of 1781, chap. 201. Mfaryland: Guage of barrels for pork, beef, pitch, tar,
turpentine, and tare of barrels for flour or bread, 1745, chap. 15. Flour barrels,
1771, chap. 20; 1781, chap. 12. Staves and headings, 1745, chap. 15 ; 1771, chap.
20 ; 1786, chap. 17. Salted provisions, 1745, chap. 15 ; 1786, chap. 17. Hay
and straw, 1771, chap. 20. Flour, 1781, chap. 12. Fish, 1786, chap. 17. Liquor
casks, 1774, chap. 23; 1777, chap. 17 ; 1784, chap. 83; 1785, chap. 87. Many
other Maryland Provincial Laws, prescribing the length, superficial and solid
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of'the inspection laws of the thirteen American colonies and States, in
force in 1787, when the Constitution of the United States was adopted,
that the form, capacity, dimensions and weight of packages were objects
of inspection irrespective of the quality of contents of packages. The
instances embrace, among others, the dimensions of shingles, staves and
hoops ; the size of casks and barrels for fish, pork, beef, pitch, tar and
turpentine; and the size of hogsheads of tobacco. In Maryland, the
dimensions of tobacco hogsheads were fixed by varions statutes passed
from the year 1658 to the year 1763. By the Act of 1763, chapter 18,
sect. 18, it was enacted that al] tobacco packed in hogsheads exceeding 48
inches in the length of the stave, and 70 inches in the whole diameters
within the staves, at the croze and bulge, should be accbunted unlawful
tobacco and should not be passed or received. Like provisions fixing
the dimensions of hogsheads of tobacco have been in force in Maryland
from 1789 till now. In view of such legislation existing at the time
the Constitution of the United States was adopted and ratified by the
original States, known to the framers of the Constitution who came from
the various States. and called "inspection laws" in those States, it follows that the Constitution, in speaking of "inspection laws," included
such laws, and intended to reserve to the States the power of continuing
to pass such laws, even though to carry them out, and make them effective, in preventing the exportation from the State of the various commodities unless the provisions of the laws were observed, it became
necessary to impose charges which amounted to duties or imposts on exports to an extent absolutely necessary to execute such laws. The
general sense in which the power of the States in this respect has been
understood since the adoption of the Constitution is shown by the legislation of the States since that time, as collected in like manner by the
attorney-general of Maryland,' covering the form, capacity, dimensions
measure, weight and capacity of domestic products, are collected on pages 45-47
of the Report of Mr. J. H. Alexander on the Standards of Weight and Sdeasuremeat in Maryland. Virginia: Laws of Virginia. Revisal 1783, pp. 47, 188, 192.
Pork, &c., required to be packed in barrels before exportation. As to contents,
quality and stamps of barrels of pork, beef, pitch, tar and turpentine, see Ibid. p.
47, Act of 1776, chap. 43. Inspection of tobacco, and size of tobacco hogsheads.
Act of 1783, chap. 10, sects. 1, 15, 20. North Carolina: Iredell's Laws of North
Carolina, ed. 1791. Dimensions of beef, pork and fish casks, staves and headings,
and of boards, planks and shingles. Act of 1784, chap. 36. South Carolina:
Grimke's Public Laws. Dimensions and capacity of beef and pork barrels, p. 209.
Georgia: Watkins's Digest. Casks for beef and pork. Size of barrels for pitch,
tar and turpentine. Act of 1766, No. 140, amended by Act of 1768, No. 179. In
the legislation of the Province and State of Maryland, in reference to tobacco, the
dimensions, or gauge, of tobacco hogsheads was fixed by the Acts of 1658, chap. 2,
1676, chap. 9, 1694, chap. 5, 1699, chap. 4, 1704, chap. 53, 1711, chap. 5, 1715,
chap. 38, 1716, chap. 8, 1717, chap. 7, 1723, chap. 25, 1747, chap. 26, 1753, chap.
22, 1763, chap. 18, and 1789, chap. 26.
1 Pennylvania: Beef and pork intended for exportation, when packed, or repacked, in Philadelphia: I Brightly's Purd. Dig. (1873) pp. 157, 158.; Butter
and Lard, Ibid. 188, 189 ; Domestic Distilled Spirits, Ibid. 525 ; Flaxseed, Ibid.
708 ; Flour and Mea], Ibid. 711. Delaware: Size of Casks for exportation of
Breadstuffs. Revised Statutes, 1874, p. 363. Virginia: Tobacco. Code. 1873,
pp. 739, 740; Fish, Ibid. 750; Pitch, Tar, Turpentine, Salt, Staves, Shingles and
Lumber, Ibid. 751. Rhode Island: Pulhic Statutes, 1882; Beef and Pork Casks,
chap. 3, p. 294; Lime Casks, Ibid. 298; Fish Casks, Ibid. chap. 114, p. 299.
Maine: Revised Statutes, 1871 ; Lime, chap. 39, sect. 3; Pot and Pearl Ashes,
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and weight of packages containing articles grown or produced in a State,
and intended for exportation. These laws are none the less inspection
laws because, as was said by this court in Gibbons v. Ogden, they "may
It is a cirhave a remote and considerable influence on commerce."
Ibid. sect. 9; Nails, Ibid. sect. 17 ; Fish, Ibid. chap. 40, sects. 7, 8 and 11 ; Cord
Wood, Ibid. chap. 41, sect. 1 ; Charcoal Baskets, Ibid. sect. 7; Packed Shingles,
Ibid. sect. 16 ; Staves and Hoops, Ibid. sects. 18 and 19 ; Beef and Pork Barrels,
Ibid. chap. 38, sects. 16 and 17. New Hampshire: General Laws, 1878. No
salted beef to be exported except in tierces, barrels, or half-barrels of particular
quality, weight and dimensions, and duly branded: chap. 126, sects. 4 and 5 ;
Butter and Lard Casks, chap. 127, p. 305 ; Fish Barrels, Tierces and Casks, chap.
129, p. 310; Casks of Pot and Pearl Ashes, chap. 130, p. 114. Massachusetts:
General Statutes, 1860; Casks for Pickled Fish, chap. 49, sect. 44; Alewives,
Ibid. sect. 50 ; Staves, Ibid. sect. 85; Hogshead Hoops, Ibid. sect. 86 ; Casks for
Pot and Pearl Ashes, Ibid. sect. 167 ; Kegs for Butter and Lard, Ibid. sect. 14 ;
Connecticut: General Statutes, 1875; Fish Barrels, p. 275, sect. 19. Vermont:
Revised Laws of 1880, p. 715, Barrels of Flour, weight, &c. New Jersey: Revision, 1877 ; Beef and Pork Barrels, Flour and Meal Casks, Ibid. 437 ; Herring
Casks, Ibid. 478. Georgia: Code, 1867 ; Flour Barrels, sect. 1562 ; Turpentine
Barrels, Ibid. sect. 1573. Louisiana: Digest of Statutes, vol. 2, 1870; Beef and
Pork Barrels, p. 38, sect. 28. Wisconsin: Statutes of; Fish Casks, p. 856, sect.
22. Mfichigan: Compiled Laws, 1871, vol. 1, pp. 474-485, size and weight of
Beef, Pork and Fish Barrels; Butter and Lard Barrels; Flour and Meal Casks;
Pot and Pearl Ash Casks. South Carolina: General Statutes; Flour Barrels, p.
275 ; Beef Barrels, Ibid. 279 ; Staves and Shingles, Ibid. 280. North Carolina:
Battle's Revisal; Flour Barrels, chap. 61, sect. 34, p. 496 ; Beef or Pork Casks,
Ibid. sect. 50, p. 499 ; Fish Barrels, Ibid. sect. 5q, p. 499; Turpentine, Tar and
Pitch Barrels, Ibid. sect. 54, p. 500. Tennessee: Statutes, 1871 ; Butter or Lard
Casks, sect. 1832; Flour Barrels, 1834. Florida: Digest of Laws, 1881, p. 579 ;
Sizes of Tar and Turpentine Barrels. Mississippi; Flour and Pork Barrels; Rev.
Code, 1880, sect. 949, p. 280. Ohio: Revised Statutes, 1880, vol. 1 ; Hogsbeads
of Tobacco, p. 264, sect. 391 ; Fish Barrels, Ibid. sect. 4300 ; Spirit Barrels, sect.
4327 ; Oil Barrels, sect. 4293; Pot and Pearl Ash Barrels, sect. 4291 ; Beef or
Pork Barrels, sect. 4285 ; Flour and Meal Barrels, sect. 4281.
The legislation of Maryland, since 1787, affords the following instances : Pot
and pearl ashes, intended for exportation from Baltimore, or Georgetown, in Moutgomery county, were required to be packed in a particular manner in casks, and to
be inspected and weighed : 1792, chap. 65. A similar provision was made to prevent the exportation of unmerehantable flour and unsound salted provisions from
Havre de Grace, by the Act of 1796, chap. 21 ; and from Chester, by the Act of
1797, chap. 7. By the Act of 1781, chap. 12, provision was made to prevent the
exportation of bread and flour, which were not merchantable, from the town of
Havre de Grace. This act was enacted for a limited time only, and expired. It
was revived and enacted into a permanent law by the Act of 1801, chap. 102, sect.
2, and is set forth in a note to the section last referred to, in tie Acts of 1801. By
sect. 6 of the Act of 1801, chap. 102, the size of all flour casks brought to Baltimore Town for exportation, the character of the materials and make, the manner
of hooping npv nailing such hoops, the particular length of the staves, the diameter
of the casks at the heads, and the number of pounds of flour to be in each cask,
are specifically prescribed. The.size of laths, and the mode of packing them, was
regulated by the Act of 1811, chap. 69. The number and character of hoops upon
casks of ground black oak bark, exported from the port of Baltimore, was prescribed
by the Act of 1821, chap. 77. The gross weight of a hogshead of tobacco, as well
as its net weight, was required to be marked on the hogshead by the Act of 1789,
chap. 26, sect. 21. The dimensions of the hogsheads in which tobacco was required
to be packed was prescribed by section 35 of the act last cited. Further illustration
may be found in the following legislation: Weighing Wheat, 1858, chap. 256, sect.
5 ; Frazier v. Warfield, 13 Md. 300-304 ; Fish Barrels and Tierces, Public Local
Laws, art. 4, sect. 309; Flour, Ibid. sect. 352; Domestic Distilled Liquors. Ibid.
sect. 360 ; Flour Barrels, 1 Md. Code, art. 96, sect. 20.
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cumstanee of weight that the laws referred to in the Constitution. are by
it made "subject to the revision and control of the Congress." Congress
may, therefore, interpose, if at any time any statute, under the guise
of an inspection law, goes beyond the limit prescribed by the Constitution, in imposing duties or imposts on. imports or exports. These and
kindred laws, of Maryland have been in fbrce for a long term of years,
and there has been no such interposition.
Objection is made that the- Maryland laws are not inspection laws, but
are regulations of commerce, because they require every hogshead of tobacco to be brought to a State tobacco warehouse. But we are of opinion
that, it being lawful to reqcuire the- article to be subjected to the prescribed examination, by a public officer hefore it can be accounted a lawful subject of commerce, it is not foreign to the character of an inspection
law to require that the article shall be brought to the officer instead of
sending the officer to the article. It is a matter as to which the State
has a reasonable diseretion, and we are unable to see that such discretion
has been emcreised in any such, manner as to carry the statutes beyond
the scope of inspection laws.
There is another view of the subject which has- great force. Recognised elements of inspection laws have always been quality of the article,
form, capacity, dimensions, and weight of package, mode of putting up,
and marking and branding of various kinds-all these matters being
supervised by a public officer having authority to pass or not to pass the
article as lawful merchandise, as it did or did not answer the prescribed
requirements. It has never been regarded as necessary, and it is manirestly not necessary, that all of these elements should co-exist in order
to. make a valid inspection law. Quality alone may be the subject of
inspection, without other requirements, or the inspection may be made
to extend to all of the above matters. When all are prescribed, and
then inspection as to quality is dropped. out, leaving the rest in force,
it cannot be said tb be a necessary legal conclusion that the law has
ceased to be an inspection law.
As is suggested in Neilson v. Garza, 2 Woods 287, by Mr. Justice
BRADLEY, it may be doubtful whether it is not exclusively the province
of Congress, and not at allthat of a court, to decide whether a charge
or duty, under an inspection law, is or is-not excessive. There is nothing
in the record from which it can be inferred that the State of Maryland
intended to make its tobacco-inspection laws a mere cover for laying
revenue duties upon exports. The case is not like that of Jackson lIining Co. v. Auditor-General, 32 Michigan 488, where a State tax
imposed on mineral ore exported from the State before being smelted
was held to be a tax on inter-state commerce, no such tax being imposed
on like ore reduced within the State. The question of the right of
Maryland, under the Constitution of the, United States, to require that
the dimensions and gross weight of a hogshead containing tobacco grown
upon its soil shall be ascertained by its officers before the tobacco shall
be exported, is a question of law, because the question is as to whether
such law is an inspection law. Moreover, the question- as to whether
the charges for such examination, and its attendant duties are -absolutely
necessary,"i was not before the State court, and was not passed upon by
it, and cannot be considered by this court.
It is urged, however, that the Maryland law is a regulation of com-
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merce' and rnconstitutional, because. it discriminates between the State
buyer and manufacturer of leaf' tobacco and the purchaser who buys for
the purpose of transporting thb tobacco to another State or to a foreign
country. But, the state, having the right to prescribe the form, dimensions and capacity of the packages in which its products shall be encased
before they are brought to, or sold in, the public market, has enacted
(Law of 1872, chap. 86, -sect; 26) that no tobacco of the growth of
the State shall be passed or accounted lawful tobacco unless it be packed
in hogsheads of a specified size. This regulation covers all tobacco grown
in the State and packed in hogsheads, without reference to. the pu.rpose
for which it is packed. If the tobacco is to be dealt in within the limits
of the State, the examination as to dimensions is properly left to the
eontracting parties, probably under the view that the seller for the home
market will have a sufficient stimulus to observe the requirement of the
law, in a desire to maintain the reputation of his commodity. But, if
the tobacco is to be exported as lawful tobacco, the State may, with
equal propriety, prescribe and enforce an examination by an officer, within the State, of a hogshead containing tobacco grown in the State, and
intended for shipment beyond the lim~its of the State, in order tQ ascertain, before the hogshead is carried out of the State, and before it becomes
an article of commerce, that it is of the dimensions prescribed as necessary to make it lawful tobacco. In Cooley. v. Tie Board of Wardens,
12 How. 299, a law of Pennsylvania provided that a vessel not taking a pilot should pay half pilotage, but that this should not apply to
American vessels engaged in the Pennsylvania coal trade. It was held
that the general regulation as to half pilotage was prdper, and that the
exemption was a fair exercise of legislative discretion acting upon the
subject of the regulation of the pilotage of the port of Philadelphia.
The court said, tha t, in making pilotage regulations, the legislative discretion had been constantly exercised, in this and other countries, in
making discriminations, founded on differences both in the character of
the trade and in the tonnage of vessels engaged therein. Any discrimination appearing is in the present case of the same character as that
in the pilotage case, and fairly within the discreaiou of the State. Such
discretion reasonably extends to exempting from opening for internal inspection an article grown in the State, when it is marked with the name
of an ascertained owner, and to requiring that an article grown in, the
State shall be opened for internal inspection when it is not intended to
be put on the market on the credit of an ascertained owner and is not
identified by marks as owned by him. So, too, in the exercise of the
same discretion, and of its power to prescribe the method in which its
products shall be fitted for exportation, it may direct that a certain product, while it remains " in the bosom of the country" and before it
has become an article "of foreign commerce or of commerce between
the States," shall be encased in such a package as appears best fitted to
secure the safety of the package and to identify its contents as the growth
of the State, and may direct that the weight of the package, and the
name of the owner of its contents, shall be plainly marked on tre package, and may also exempt the contents from inspection as to quality,
when the weight of the package and the name of the owner are duly
ascertained to be marked thereon. Such a law is an inspection law, and
may be executed, ly imposing a "tax or duty of inspection,," which tax,
VOL. XX-XI.27
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so far as it acts upon articles for exportation, is an exception to the prohibition on the States against laying duties on exports, the exception
being made because the tax would otherwise be within the prohibition.
Brown v. Te State of lfaryland, 12 Wheaton 419, 438. At the
same time we fully recognise the principle, that any inspection law is
subject to the paramount right- of Congress to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several States.
The general provision of the Maryland statute is, that it shall not be
lawful to carry out of the State, in hogsheads, any tobacco raised in the
State, except in hogsheads which shall have been inspected, passed and
marked agreeably to the provisions of the act. These provisions include
the doing of many things in addition to an inspection of quality. If the
tobacco is grown in the State, and packed in the county or neighborhood
where grown, it may be carried out of the State without having its quality
inspected, if it be marked in the manner prescribed. But it still is
necessary it should be inspected in all other particulars, and inspected
also to ascertain that it was grown in the State and packed where grown
and is marked as required. If it does not answer the latter requirements
it is to be further inspected as to quality. The necessity thus existing
for subjecting the hogshead to inspection under all circumstances, a
charge of some kind was proper for outage, that is, a -charge payable,
on withdrawing the hogshead, for labor connected with receiving and
handling it and doing the other things above mentioned. Such charge
appears to be a charge for services properly rendered.
The above views cover the objection made that the Maryland law discriminates between different classes of exporters of tobacco, and favors
the person who packs it for exportation in the county or neighborhood
where it is grown, as against other exporters. Whatever discrimination
in this respect or in respect of purchases for exportation, before referred
to, results from any provisions of the law, is a discrimination which, we
think, the state has a right to make, resulting, as it does, wholly from
regulations which affect the article before it has become an article of
commerce, and which attach to it as and when it is grown, and before
it is packed or sold. The tobacco is grown with these regulations in
force, and the state has a right to say what shall be lawful merchantable
tobacco. This is really all that has been done in regard to the tobacco
in question.
In this case no inspection is involved except that of tobacco grown
in Maryland, and we must not be understood as expressing any opinion
as to any provisions of the Maryland laws which refer to the inspection
of tobacco grown out of Maryland.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland is affirmed
The Articles of Confederation, agreed
to in 1778, formed a league between
States: Federalist, No. 43. Under those
articles each State could enact any laws
intended to improve the quality of any
one or more of its products, or to identify
them as the growth of its soil, or to
prepare such products for exportation
to markets beyond its territorial limits.

These powers were exercised by means
of inspection laws: Gibbons v. Ogden, 9
Wheat. 203. Each State could lay any
impost or duty upon any article exported
from, or imported into, its territories,
unless such impost or duty interfered
with some stipulation of a treaty entered
into by Congress with a foreign power:
Art. 6 ; and Congress was forbidden to
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make any treaty which prohibited the
exportation or importation of any commodities whatsoever: Art. 9. The government, formed under those articles,
had. therefore, no power to regulate by
law commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations. The lack of this
authority was one of the principal motives
for the formation of a new Union : Federalist, No. 22.
In the Constitution of 1787, which
created the new Union, complete authority was given to Congress "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes:" Const. U. S., art. 1,
sect. 8, sub-clause 3. The power thus
given to Congress was qualified by a
subsequent clause, framed for the purpose of limiting the power of that body
over the commerce of the States. It
was provided that, "No tax or duty
shall be laid upon articles exported from
any State: Const. U. S., art. 1, sect. 9,
sub-clause 5, Federalist No. 32; Story
on Const. U. S., sects. 1013, 1014;
Woodrqffv. Parham,8Wall. 144; Wrard
v. Maryland, 12 Id. 427.
The limited power thus given to Congress is necessarily exclusive (Gibbons
v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 189-202) whenever
the subject to which it relates is of such
nature as to require that Congress only
should exercise the power: Cooley v.
Port Wiardes, 12 Howard 319 ; Gilman
N. Jhdladelphia,3 Wall. 730 ; Tiernanv.
Pinker, 102 U. S. 126; County of lobile
v. Kimball, Id. 696-702; but it does
not, of course, extend, as an exclusive
power, to any subject excepted from its
operation by some other provision of the
Federal Constitution: .3funn v. Illinois,
94 U. S. 124 ; County of 1obile v. Kimball, 102 Id. 696-702.
The subject of "inspections" has been
thus excepted from the exclusive power
of Congress by a subsequent clause of the
Constitution: Brown v. faryland, 12
Wheat. 438. "1No State shall, without
the consent of Congress, lay any imposts,

or duties, on imports, or exports, except
what may be absolutely necessaryfor exe
enting its inspection laws; and the net
produce of all duties, and imposts, laid
by any State on imports, or exports,
shall be for the use of the treasury of the
United States ; and all such laws shall
be subject to the revision and control
of Congress :" Const. U. S., art. 1,
sect. 10, sub-clause 2.
The power of each State to enact inspection laws was recognised in this subclause by necessary implication: Brown
v. M.1aryland, 12 Wheat. 438-4,14 ; Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 131-133, 136 ;
M1achine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 677.
Each State was left as much at liberty to
provide by law for the improvement of
the quality of articles produced by its
labor, or for identifying them as the
growth of its soil, or for fitting such
articles for exportation, or domestic use,
as it was before the Articles of Confederation were adopted, or as it was
while those Articles remainad in force:
Federalist, No. 32 ; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9
Wheat. 203; Ward v. M1aryland, 12
Wall. 428, 431 ; Webber v. Virginia, 103
U. S. 348.
Inspection laws, indeed, form a part
of that immense mass of legislation,
embracing every power capable of being
exercised by a State within its territory,
which has not been surrendered to the
general government, and can be exercised
most advantageously by the State itself:
Sturges v. Crouningshield,4 Wheat. 195,
196 ; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Id. 203 ; City
of New York v. Milne, 11 Peters 141 ;
Passenger Cases, 7 How. 398, 400, 414,
415, 417, 558; License Tax Cases, 5
Wall. 471 ; United States v. De Witt, 9
Id. 43, 44; Patterson v. Kentucky, 97
U. S. 503, 504. They are considered;
though particularly mentioned in the
Federal Constitution, as being, nevertheless, parts of the police legislation
of each state : Lzwense Cases, 5 Howard
592 ; Passenger Cases, 7 Id. 424, 435 ;
City of New ork v. Milne, 11 Pet. 141,
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142. They" meet the commercial, power
of the Union in dealing with subjects.
under the protection of that power,"
althougn they exercise an authority which
'-can only be exerted under peculiar
circumstances and to a limited extent:"
Pa.senger Cases, 7 Howard 408, 415License Cases, 5-Id. 608, 625. 627, 631 ;
Baldwin's Const. Views 189-192, 195',
196. They are, indeed, the exercise
of powers which do not admit of a uniform system of national legislation : Witson v. Black Bird Creek Co., 2'Pet. 445.
Each State, in exercising its continuing powers under the Federal Constitution to enact inspection laws, has the
right to use a fair legislative discretion
as to all matters within the scope of such
power: Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12
How. 313. It is only necessary to add
to the references appended by the court
to its opinion, that it is matter of common knowledge that the weight of a
barrel of flour, of a barrel of corn meal,
of a barrel of pork or beef, of a bushel
of wheat or corn, of a ton of anthracite
coal, of live stock, of a load of manure,
and of many other articles, is prescribed
by the laws of many of the States ; and,
where such provisions exist, and officers
are appointed to execute them, the laws
of such States are, in principle, precisely
identical with the early English statutes
and charters, upon which- they were in
truth founded. Such articles may be
weighed where they are found, or may
be required to be brought to the "Public
"
Beam, ' as was necessary, under the
charter of I Hen. IV., to the city of Lon(on, in the case of "lead, wax, pepper,
'allom' and the like," to be there duly
weighed by appointed public officers:
Customs of London, 3d ed., 16.
Among the inspection laws which were
repealed by the Statute of 5 Geo. IV.,
chap. 74, sect. 23, was the Statute of 23
Eliz., chap. S. This act would seem to
have been the original of those acts wl ich
substitute the branding of the name of
the owner, grower or maker of the par-

ticular article on the package for an
inspection of the contents of the package.
]By it (sect. k) a melter of unwrought
wax was required to stamp his name on
every melted piece; and barrels, kilderkins, firkins, or casks of honey (sect. 4)
were required to be marked with the
initials of the name and surname of the
maker or filler.
As laws prescribing the form or weight
of a package containing an article produced in a State are inspection laws,
they are laws which the State enacting
them may, under the express terms of
art. 1, sect. tO, sub-clause 2, of the
Federal Constitution, execute by imposing duties on exports: Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 438; Neilson v. Garza,
2 Woods 290 ; City of NVew York v.
M11ilne, 11 Pet. 141, 142 ; Pack'et Co. v.
St. Louis, 100 U. S. 429; Vicksburg
o
v. Tobin, Id. 432. The word "exp rts,"
to,
last
referred
used in the sub-clanse
does not refer to articles brought from
one State into another State, but refers
exclusively to articles exported to foreign
countries: Woodrqff v. Parham, 8 WalL.
131-133, 136; Machine Co. v. Gage, 100
U. S. 677.
It was not required by the sub-clause
referred to, that the imposts, or duties,
levied by a State upon an imported or
exported article, subject to inspection,
should be such only as were absolutely
necessary for the execution of the particular laws requiling the inspection of
such article, but only that they should be
such as were absolutely necessary for the
execution of the "inspection laws" of
the State: Packet Co. v. St. Louis, TOO
U. S.. 429, 430. The power of a State
to lay such imposts, or duties, is, within
the limits of the grant, a power as exclusive as any power vested in Congress :
lTrarrv. M3aryland, 12 Wall. 427; FOster v. New Orleans, 94 U. S. 248.
If laws of any State, laying imposts.
or duties, on exports, are inspection laws,
within the fair intendment of art. 1,
sect. 10, sub-claine 2, of tie Constittuion

